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It is an unforgettable dinner that ends in murder, especially the murder of a man who would 
be king. At an assembly held in 1002, shortly after the sudden death of the heirless Emperor 
Otto III, ruler of the Ottonian Reich, we are faced with precisely this scenario. Margrave 
Ekkehard of Meißen, a frontrunner in the race to become the next king, is said to have taken 
over a feast prepared for two of the late emperor’s sisters: Adelheid, the abbess of 
Quedlinburg, and Sophia, a canoness at Gandersheim. We are told that by interrupting the 
sisters’ feast, he not only brought about his own defeat, but also ensured his violent murder at 
the hands of his enemies shortly afterwards. The events at this dinner, held in the Ottonian 
palace at Werla, were a turning point in this succession contest: by removing a possible 
future leader and allowing the eventual victor the chance to push forward his own claim to 
the throne, the feast determined who would become the next ruler of the German Empire. 
 
The events at Werla represent a landmark in the 1002 succession contest, which itself has 
been the subject of considerable debate by historians of medieval Germany. As Otto III had 
died before he could produce an heir, the subsequent competition for the throne by a number 
of candidates allows us to discern early medieval ideas about what constituted a legitimate 
king. The series of deliberations among the German elite leading up to the eventual 
coronation of a new ruler in 1002 lets us test ideas about kingship in this period: did one 
become king on the basis of hereditary succession from previous rulers, or was kingship 
achieved through election by the other magnates of the kingdom?1 Moreover, the succession 
contest has also featured in scholarly debates on symbolic communication in the German 
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empire. Political events in early medieval Germany were highly choreographed, and there is 
ongoing discussion about the ability of individuals to secure their power and achieve their 
political goals through using public demonstrative gestures and ritual acts.2 
 
As a result, the feast at Werla and its disastrous aftermath have quite understandably drawn 
the attention of historians. Here we have a striking example of the destructive forces that 
demonstrative acts – such as disrupting a feast – could apparently unleash. In the various 
analyses of the succession dispute of 1002, Ekkehard’s behaviour at Werla is uniformly 
considered to be the cause of his defeat. His insult towards Otto III’s sisters cost him both the 
throne and his life. Yet, despite the consensus on the consequences of Ekkehard’s actions, 
thus far there has been no truly convincing explanation for his motivations. Why would an 
experienced political figure act in this way, especially in a society so sensitive to honour and 
insult that disputes were usually negotiated behind closed doors before public resolutions 
were enacted? This article offers a set of new perspectives on Ekkehard’s reasons for 
appearing at the sisters’ table by considering the relationships that already existed between 
the various individuals who were present at the feast. These perspectives help us understand 
why the sisters are shown responding so negatively; why they both chose to support Henry of 
Bavaria as their brother’s successor; and what this episode reveals about how the Saxon elite 
responded to the succession crisis after Otto III’s death. 
 
Before we move on to this analysis though, we should begin by outlining the account of the 
feast that we have. Our source for this episode is Thietmar, Bishop of Merseburg and a Saxon 
nobleman himself, who reported the events at Werla and offered some commentary in his 
Chronicon, written just over a decade later.3 Thietmar recorded that in January 1002, the 
sudden death of the twenty-one-year-old Emperor Otto III had sparked a contest among the 
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German elite for the throne. Since Otto was unmarried, with no son, no close male relatives, 
and no nominated successor, there was no logical candidate to succeed him.  Accordingly, 
various noblemen tried to push forward their claims to become king. Three men quickly 
emerged as the frontrunners in the succession contest. Duke Hermann of Swabia, Margrave 
Ekkehard of Meißen and the eventual winner, Duke Henry of Bavaria (later Henry II), spent 
the first half of 1002 travelling around the German regions of the empire, trying to gain 
support from the other members of the ruling elite for their candidacy. In April, an assembly 
was held at Werla, in the Saxon heartland of the empire.  
 
The Chronicon describes in detail how Ekkehard’s downfall played out at the assembly. The 
nobles of Saxony had come together at Werla to discuss which man they would collectively 
endorse as the new king. Amongst them were Adelheid of Quedlinburg and Sophia of 
Gandersheim – Otto III’s sisters and leaders of Ottonian imperial convents within Saxony.4 
Henry had sent a delegate to the assembly to make his case, following the advice of his 
supporter, Count Liuthar of the Northern March. Henry’s representative offered the Saxons 
rewards and promises of ‘many good things’ to those who would support Henry’s claim to 
the kingship.5 These promises were persuasive. The majority of those gathered responded 
that Henry should indeed become the next king, and they swore to support him in his bid for 
the throne. Thietmar reported that this decision greatly upset Ekkehard, who fought back 
against the public affirmation of Saxon support for his rival that very evening. A table had 
been richly prepared for the imperial sisters in the palace at Werla following the assembly. 
Ekkehard ‘took over it’ and dined there in the company of Bishop Arnulf of Halberstadt and 
Duke Bernhard of Saxony, greatly disturbing Adelheid and Sophia.6 The next morning, ‘as 
everything which he had anticipated would happen in that place had turned out differently to 
what he had hoped for,’ Ekkehard departed in the company of his other supporter, Bishop 
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Bernward of Hildesheim, to the latter’s see, where he was received in the manner of a king.7 
Shortly after the assembly, Ekkehard was set upon and murdered at Pöhlde by a group of 
Saxon noblemen, which included the sons of Count Siegfried of Northeim. Thietmar 
commented that while he could not explain this murder himself, he had heard that some 
linked it to the events at Werla, attributing it to the insult and threatening remarks that 
Ekkehard had publicly made to Otto’s sisters at the feast.8 
 
Following Ekkehard’s demise, Henry and Hermann were left as the only competitors for the 
throne. A majority of German nobles had pledged their support for Hermann following Otto 
III’s funeral held in April at Aachen. Nevertheless, Henry had secured the support of the 
Saxon elites, and following the death of Ekkehard he ventured out to Mainz, where 
Archbishop Willigis crowned and anointed him as king in June 1002. Hermann and his 
supporters continued to oppose Henry for a few months, but by October Hermann had 
recognized Henry as his king, before dying in 1003.9 The succession dispute was resolved 
with Henry as the final victor. The collapse of Ekkehard’s bid for the throne was thus the 
turning point in the succession contest that led to Henry of Bavaria succeeding Otto III as 
king, and eventually as emperor. 
 
Those who have analysed the events of 1002 have consistently argued that Ekkehard’s 
behaviour toward Otto’s sisters, Adelheid and Sophia, placed the seal on his defeat. After all, 
Thietmar himself said that others were attributing his murder to the insult that he had offered 
the pair. However, there is no consensus on what Ekkehard hoped to achieve from this insult. 
Was it an outraged response to the sisters’ declaration of support for his rival, Henry?10 Did 
Ekkehard simply underestimate the influence of the Ottonian sisters in a foolhardy attempt to 
push his own claim without sufficient support?11 Or could it just be a ‘fit of pique’?12 Karl 
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Leyser offered a reading of the events that focused less on Ekkehard’s emotional state and 
more on the purportedly demonstrative aim behind his actions. He argued that Ekkehard’s 
commandeering of Adelheid and Sophia’s dinner was a symbolic dismissal of the Ottonian 
dynasty’s role in the succession contest. Identifying the two sisters as representatives of the 
Ottonian dynasty, Leyser suggested that they had an ‘enhanced sacral place and role’ in 
determining their brother’s successor; their approval could legitimize their distant cousin 
Henry by presenting him as a close relative who shared in the imperial legacy of their 
family.13 Ekkehard, however, had far less of a claim to be a member of the Ottonian dynasty 
through his family connections than Henry.14 As such, his insult to the sisters could be read 
as an insult to the imperial dynasty that they represented, a repudiation of the need to gain 
their legitimization for his power.  
 
This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that it was a public dinner that Ekkehard chose 
to disrupt. Feasts (convivia) have attracted the attention of those interested in ritual 
communication and bonds of association in medieval society.15  A convivium provided an 
opportunity to publicly assert common bonds between the participants, acting as a pledge of 
mutual co-operation and support. These feasts were particularly linked to friendship alliances, 
co-operative associations, and commemorative confraternities.16 As such, these meals made a 
statement about the horizontal ties of friendship – whether real or affected – that linked the 
participants.17 Consequently, any kind of subversion of a convivium, whether that was 
through poor behaviour or through violence, could be interpreted in the opposite way: rather 
than signalling the support, trust and co-operation between the participants, it instead 




Yet, if Ekkehard’s arrival at the feast was intended to be an insult to the sisters, then we must 
also ask why he did not foresee the fallout from such an explosive political act. In all other 
regards, Ekkehard was a successful politician. He was extremely well regarded by Otto III 
and had received benefices granted to him outright as personal properties.19 He had defended 
the eastern border of the empire and maintained good relationships with external rulers. He 
claimed military service from Duke Boleslav of Bohemia and had the support of Duke 
Bołeslaw Chrobry of Poland, confirmed through the marriage of Ekkehard’s son to 
Bołeslaw’s daughter and Ekkehard’s brother to Bołeslaw’s sister, or possibly sister-in-law.20 
Thietmar reported that he was elected duke over Thuringia and that the eastern counts of the 
empire supported his attempt to succeed Otto III. His death was marked by Thietmar praising 
him as ‘the pride of the kingdom, a solace to his fatherland, the hope of his subjects and the 
terror of his enemies’.21 Ekkehard was no foolhardy newcomer to Ottonian assemblies, but 
someone with a lifetime’s experience in both regional and imperial politics. It is difficult to 
explain why a seasoned political figure like Ekkehard would make such a shortsighted 
decision to publicly insult two individuals who could provide royal legitimization during a 
hard-fought succession contest. 
 
If, then, we recognize that Ekkehard was well aware of how politics functioned in Ottonian 
society and that he knew the risk involved in insulting other individuals in public events, we 
should try to understand what he thought his actions at the feast could achieve. Given the 
importance of the events at Werla to the outcome of the succession crisis, it is worth re-
examining Ekkehard’s possible motivations in appearing before Adelheid and Sophia at their 
dinner with his supporters alongside him. By thinking closely about the kinds of relationships 
that existed between the individuals who were present in the room, the events at the feast can 
be read in a very different light. 
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According to Thietmar, Ekkehard arrived at the feast with two of his supporters, Duke 
Bernhard of Saxony and Bishop Arnulf of Halberstadt, both of whom were influential figures 
in Saxon politics.22 However, these two men were not connected to Ekkehard alone. Both 
Bernhard and Arnulf were also closely linked to Adelheid, in her role as abbess of 
Quedlinburg. Arnulf, the diocesan bishop for Quedlinburg, had consecrated Adelheid as 
abbess of the convent three years earlier.23 From the detailed account given of Adelheid’s 
consecration in the Quedlinburg Annals, a text written under her supervision from 1008 
onwards, we see that immediately before Adelheid became abbess, Arnulf had conferred with 
two other men in order to arrange her consecration. Those two individuals were Duke 
Bernhard and Bishop Bernward of Hildesheim, both of whom Thietmar presented in the 
company of Ekkehard at Werla.24 Adelheid had close and apparently beneficial relationships 
with the key allies that Ekkehard had gathered in his bid for the throne. 
 
However, Adelheid’s consecration was not the first time that she had met Ekkehard and his 
supporters. Ekkehard, Bernhard and Bernward were all part of a group that had sworn an oath 
– a coniuratio – against Henry’s father, Duke Henry the Quarrelsome of Bavaria. Otto II had 
died in 983 while on campaign in southern Italy, whereupon his cousin Henry the 
Quarrelsome took custody of the young Otto III and eventually tried to claim the throne in his 
own right in 984. A group of Saxon magnates, including these three men, swore to oppose 
Henry and to restore Otto III as his father’s successor.25 The coniuratio took action by 
successfully attacking the fortress at Alaburg, held by Henry’s supporters. In doing so, 
Thietmar reported, they freed the young Adelheid, who was being held there along with some 
treasure.26 While coniurationes like this most likely disbanded after they had achieved their 
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objective – in this case the restoration of Otto III in 985 – the oaths that had bound these men 
together, and which linked them to Adelheid, must have still resonated in 1002.27 
 
Indeed, after Otto III was given back into the care of his mother, Empress Theophanu, his 
grandmother, Empress Adelheid, and his aunt, Abbess Mathilda of Quedlinburg, Ekkehard 
fostered a particularly close connection to the convent of Quedlinburg himself. He was an 
intercessor in two of Otto III’s diplomas to Quedlinburg issued during Adelheid’s de facto 
regency. The first was a charter which both confirmed the donation of Adelheid’s dowry to 
Quedlinburg and established a daughter convent at Walbeck in 992, which also featured 
Duke Bernhard and two other members of the coniuratio from 984, Count Palatine Dietrich 
and Count Sigbert of Liesgau (Bernward of Hildesheim’s father and uncle), as intercessors. 
The second was a charter granting property at Potsdam and Geltow to Quedlinburg in 993.28 
Ekkehard even placed his young daughter, Liutgard, into the care of Abbess Mathilda at 
Quedlinburg for her education before her marriage.29  
 
However, around 999, during Mathilda’s period of governance over Saxony during Otto III’s 
campaign in Italy, Thietmar tells us that Ekkehard began to reconsider his daughter’s 
betrothal to Werner, the son of Count Liuthar of the Northern March. His hesitancy prompted 
Werner to raid Quedlinburg and abduct Liutgard while Mathilda was holding an assembly at 
Derenburg. Mathilda’s response to the abduction was emphatic. She forced Werner to return 
Liutgard to her care, offer compensation and beg her forgiveness. Liutgard was returned to 
Quedlinburg and remained there under Abbess Adelheid’s supervision after Mathilda’s death 
later that year.30 Mathilda was unquestionably on Ekkehard’s side in the quarrel with Liuthar 
and Werner, and the Quedlinburg Annals further report that the assembly where Werner was 
forced to make amends to Mathilda was convened by the abbess along with Duke Bernhard 
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of Saxony.31 By tracing these relationships, we see that the convent of Quedlinburg was a 
kind of nodal point, a place where the former members of the alliance against Henry the 
Quarrelsome in 984 could continue to demonstrate their mutual support and their links to 
Otto III, Abbess Mathilda and Abbess Adelheid. 
 
Taking these relationships into consideration, Ekkehard’s arrival at the feast accompanied by 
Arnulf and Bernhard, with Bernward waiting in the background, appears in a different light. 
Rather than seeing this as Ekkehard’s attempt to offer an insult to the sisters by disrupting 
and subverting the symbolism of their feast, we can read it in a more straightforward manner. 
Ekkehard had a strong case to make for Adelheid to be counted amongst his supporters. He 
appeared before her in the company of their mutual friends at a convivium, an occasion 
associated with exactly the kinds of friendship alliances and mutual bonds that linked them 
together. In so doing, Ekkehard was publicly emphasizing the connections that linked him to 
both Adelheid and Quedlinburg, a site strongly associated with ideas of Ottonian rulership 
and legitimate imperial power. 
 
In addition to stressing his relationship to Adelheid, Ekkehard’s arrival at the feast alongside 
his powerful Saxon allies sent another message about his claim to power. Ekkehard was 
already a member of the ruling elite of Saxony, the heartland of the Ottonian Empire. In 
comparison with Henry, whose political power base was to the south in Bavaria, Ekkehard 
was a well-established figure in the network of elites that lay at the centre of the empire. In 
the aftermath of a Saxon assembly pledging their support for his Bavarian rival, Ekkehard’s 
entrance alongside Bernhard and Arnulf, followed by his journey with Bernward the next 




As such, rather than trying to insult the sisters of his former king and patron Otto III, I 
suggest that Ekkehard was making an aggressive bid to publicly remind Adelheid of her 
connections to him and his supporters. In doing so, he may well have hoped that she would 
withdraw her backing for his rival, Henry, and instead endorse him as her brother’s 
successor. Winning the support of the late emperor’s sister and the leader of Quedlinburg – 
an institution in Saxony closely linked to the Ottonian dynasty – would help mitigate some of 
the damage dealt to Ekkehard’s bid to become Otto III’s successor. The symbolic acquisition 
of Quedlinburg would have been a powerful message to send to a Saxon audience as well; it 
was the place where Henry’s father had tried and failed to take the throne from Otto III in 
984.32 Indeed, this may have been part of Ekkehard’s appeal to Adelheid, frankly reminding 
her that he and his supporters had freed her from her captivity at the hands of Henry’s father, 
thus linking Henry by association to the rebellion against her brother. If Ekkehard had 
achieved his aim to win over Adelheid, he may have prompted enough Saxon nobles present 
to switch their endorsement back to him as the Saxon candidate for the throne to allow him to 
continue on in the succession contest. Ekkehard, shaken by the declaration of Saxon approval 
for his rival, must have felt that the potential benefits of publicly claiming Adelheid as a 
supporter were great enough to take the risk of stepping outside the usually regimented 
character of Ottonian political events.33 
 
While Ekkehard was probably hoping to claim Adelheid’s support, he likely did not expect 
her sister, Sophia, to join him as well. Although Adelheid had favourable relationships with 
all of the men that accompanied Ekkehard at Werla, Sophia had a long and bitter relationship 
with one of them in particular. Bishop Bernward of Hildesheim and Sophia had been 
involved in the so-called Gandersheimer Streit, an acrimonious battle over the control of the 
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convent of Gandersheim, where she had been placed as a young child by her parents around 
979.34 The conflict began, so the account from Hildesheim says, when Sophia was to be 
veiled as canoness. The bishop of Hildesheim and the archbishop of Mainz had both claimed 
that they had the right to perform the consecration as both claimed authority over the 
convent. Although the heated argument between the two men was settled by both of them 
veiling Sophia at the same time, the question of which diocese had authority over 
Gandersheim was not fully resolved.35 
 
When Sophia began to take a more active role in the affairs of her convent in the 990s, the 
conflict with Hildesheim reignited. The consecration of the rebuilt church at Gandersheim in 
1000 led to open antagonism between Archbishop Willigis of Mainz and Sophia on the one 
hand, and Bernward of Hildesheim on the other. Both of these men held prominent positions 
in Otto III’s court, with Willigis serving as archchancellor and a guardian figure to Otto 
during his minority, while Bernward was Otto’s tutor. It was likely a shift in power between 
the two men that rekindled the Gandersheimer Streit: when Otto reached his majority in 994, 
Willigis could no longer sustain his position of prominence as the young king’s guardian.36 
For this reason, Bernward, who remained close to Otto throughout the 990s, may have been 
emboldened to push once again Hildesheim’s claim of authority over Gandersheim. Willigis 
and Bernward resorted to a set of competing synods, each trying to assert their right to 
preside over Gandersheim. A series of aggressive scenes at these synods culminated in a 
violent attack by Willigis’s supporters on Bernward’s proprietary convent of 
Hilwartshausen.37 A final synod was called by the pope, but at the point that the conflict was 
coming to a head, Otto died. Settling the dispute over Gandersheim was postponed until the 
more pressing issue of the succession was resolved. Thus, while the Werla assembly was 
 12 
being held in April 1002, the conflict between Bernward and the pair of Sophia and Willigis, 
a prominent supporter of Henry of Bavaria, was still simmering in the background. 
 
As tension mounted in the phase of the Gandersheim Conflict before the emperor’s death, a 
further critically important development took place. Gerberga, the abbess of Gandersheim, 
died on November 13/14, 1001.38 However, no successor was appointed as abbess at 
Gandersheim until after the resolution of the succession contest in mid-1002. It was only after 
Henry had been crowned king, that Sophia was consecrated as abbess by Willigis of Mainz, 
in the same ceremony that he crowned Henry’s wife, Cunigund, as queen.39 The length of 
time that Gandersheim went without an abbess has not struck scholars as especially 
remarkable. Instead, the gap between Gerberga’s death and Sophia’s consecration has been 
seen as the consequence of Otto III’s death, with Sophia as the ‘obvious successor’, 
designated as such well before Gerberga’s death.40 Yet the ongoing conflict hinged precisely 
on the question of who had jurisdiction over Gandersheim; this must have been a central 
factor in the delay before consecrating the next abbess of the community. Any action by 
either Willigis or Bernward to consecrate a successor to Gerberga would have been an 
intolerable act of aggression in the already volatile dispute. As a result, Sophia was in a 
precarious situation in 1002. She did not have an official position of authority over 
Gandersheim, which was by no means a formality in the environment where this exact issue 
was being scrutinized. Should Bernward succeed in pushing his claim to authority over the 
community, Sophia’s chance of becoming abbess must have seemed less likely. Her future at 
Gandersheim was still in question when the feast took place. 
 
With these events in mind, Ekkehard’s appearance at the feast alongside two powerful men 
with close connections to her sister must have alarmed Sophia. As the Gandersheim Conflict 
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proved, Sophia had a very close relationship with Willigis of Mainz. Due to Willigis’s strong 
support of Henry of Bavaria as Otto’s successor, it was a logical option for Sophia to also 
support Henry. With Henry’s backing, Willigis could rebut Bernward’s claims of authority 
over her community, and Sophia would be able to become abbess of Gandersheim. This 
alone may have been enough to lead Sophia to support Henry’s bid to become king, but she 
also had another reason to be positively disposed to the duke: her convent of Gandersheim 
had long been linked with Henry’s branch of the Ottonian family. Abbess Gerberga, who had 
led Gandersheim from around 956 down to her death in 1001, was the daughter of Henry the 
Younger, thus making her the sister of Henry the Quarrelsome and the aunt of Henry of 
Bavaria.41 Over the past four decades of Gerberga’s rule, Gandersheim was tangibly 
connected to the Bavarian branch of the Ottonian family, a connection made permanent in 
995 when Henry the Quarrelsome died and was buried in the convent’s church.42 As the 
burial site of his father, ruled by his aunt, Henry of Bavaria surely would have visited 
Gandersheim and met with his relative Sophia.43 Given her close connection to Willigis, it is 
not difficult to imagine that Sophia and Henry had a friendly relationship in their own right, 
which must have been further galvanized by the events leading up to the feast at Werla. 
 
If, however, Ekkehard won the contest for the throne, then Sophia’s future would be 
markedly less bright. Although Bernward was tactfully absent at the feast, it was scarcely a 
secret that he supported Ekkehard’s bid. Their connection was proven beyond doubt when the 
pair rode to Hildesheim together the next day and Bernward received Ekkehard in the manner 
of a king. If Ekkehard did succeed, Bernward would be in a very powerful position. As we 
have seen, Sophia’s grip on Gandersheim was already uncertain; after the blow of losing her 
brother as a patron and supporter, the possibility of Ekkehard becoming king must have been 
intolerable to Sophia.  
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Yet, in contrast to her sister’s vehement opposition to Bernward, Adelheid’s relationship with 
the bishop of Hildesheim was essentially positive. Bernward had helped Adelheid succeed 
her aunt Mathilda as abbess of Quedlinburg in 999.44 In fact the Annalist, writing under 
Adelheid’s supervision, used the now-lost Annales Hildesheimensis maiores as a source for 
its entries up until the eleventh century, suggesting a further connection between the two 
institutions under Adelheid’s leadership.45 It is surprising to see Adelheid maintaining links 
to her sister’s opponent, especially as the two women were often presented in each other’s 
company, acting in unison in our sources.46 However, we must not mistake these carefully 
constructed textual representations as evidence for Adelheid and Sophia sharing identical 
motivations and patronage networks. While they were both sisters of the late emperor and 
leaders of convents, the different individuals who were linked to each woman reveal that they 
were in fact connected to two different groups of nobles and bishops.47 On the death of Otto 
III, these groups each backed a different candidate for the throne. The tensions that resulted 
from the contested succession carved up the political elite of the kingdom, with earlier 
rivalries and conflicts roughly determining the cluster of supporters around each candidate.48 
Sophia’s close connections to Henry of Bavaria and Willigis of Mainz brought her into their 
group, not least because Ekkehard’s group included her opponent, Bernward. On the other 
hand, Adelheid had far less pleasant memories of Henry’s father’s attempt to seize the throne 
for himself; this, along with her history of friendly relationships with Ekkehard and his 
supporters, would have made it feasible to expect Adelheid to support Ekkehard.49 
 
With a better understanding of the kinds of political relationships linking all those present at 
the feast, Ekkehard’s appearance in front of the sisters can be read very differently. It is 
difficult to see Ekkehard coming to co-opt Adelheid and Sophia’s dinner with the intention of 
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insulting them as representatives of the no-longer relevant Ottonian dynasty. Instead, it is 
more likely that Ekkehard was dismayed at the show of support for his rival by both Adelheid 
and the rest of the Saxon assembly and thus appeared at the feast in the hopes of forcefully 
reminding Adelheid of her relationships with him and his supporters. Although his behaviour 
was high-risk, in that it stepped outside of the stage-managed actions that usually 
characterized these political assemblies, it is unlikely that his primary intention was to insult 
the pair.  
 
The feast that had been organized may in fact have been the ideal scene for Ekkehard to make 
his case. After the coniuratio of 984 had been formed at Asselburg, Henry the Quarrelsome 
had travelled to confront them at Werla, about thirty kilometres away, but he was forced to 
retreat and escaped to Bavaria.50 Coniurationes and friendship alliances were closely 
associated with convivia – the successful defence of Werla may well have been followed by a 
feast at the palace before the coniuratio set out to attack Alaburg and rescue Adelheid. If that 
is the case, then the feast there in 1002 would have been the perfect setting to sharpen an 
appeal to the mutual support and co-operation that Adelheid would be expected to show 
towards Ekkehard and his fellow oath-takers.51 Indeed, if Ekkehard had truly wanted to 
communicate disrespect, he simply could have brought Bernward of Hildesheim along with 
him; Bernward would have surely been eager for any opportunity to assert his authority over 
Sophia, the unruly canoness of Gandersheim. 
 
Sadly for Ekkehard, his attempt to bring Adelheid over to his side failed. While we can not 
definitively establish what Adelheid’s reasoning was, as we have no source that outlines her 
point of view on this issue, we can however contemplate her possible motivations by 
considering her own position after Otto III’s death.52 As Ekkehard was pointedly reminding 
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her at the feast, Adelheid was a member of the group of Saxon ruling elites that made up his 
supporters. However, she had no distinct familial relationship with him that she could 
leverage in the way that she had been able to with her brother. While Ekkehard may well 
have promised her his favour and continued patronage in return for her approval, there was 
nothing to ensure that this relationship would endure for the rest of his reign. On the other 
hand, Henry did have tangible familial relationships with Adelheid and Sophia. The three all 
shared great-grandparents in King Henry I and Queen Mathilda, the first royal couple of the 
Ottonian dynasty, whose tombs conveniently lay in the church of Quedlinburg. If Henry 
became king, then Adelheid could emphasize that these bodies, along with the monastery 
built around them and dedicated to commemorating them, were much-needed sources of 
royal legitimacy for his rule.53 Henry could take his great-grandparents as models, imitating 
them and their Ottonian descendants, presenting himself as another king in their line; indeed, 
the new version of the Vita Mathildis written shortly after Henry’s accession as king echoed 
this idea exactly.54 As such, if it was indeed his Ottonian ancestry that swayed Adelheid over 
to Henry’s side, this was probably less out of some sense of dynastic solidarity than it was 
that Adelheid recognized the patronage opportunities offered by having a distinct familial 
relationship with the future king.55 
 
If the feast at Werla was indeed an attempt by Ekkehard to win over one of Otto III’s sisters 
to his cause, then we must tackle the question of why Thietmar suggested it was a deliberate 
insult. Throughout his account of Ekkehard’s actions at Werla, Thietmar presented the 
margrave as sadly arrogant and lacking in humility, with these faults eventually causing his 
own murder. He noted that Ekkehard’s actions at the feast had distressed the two sisters and 
that he later heard some people attribute Ekkehard’s death to the public insult and threats 
made to the sisters at Werla.56 However, Thietmar was not an impartial commentator on these 
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events. One of the figures woven into the narrative leading up to the Werla feast was 
Thietmar’s paternal uncle, Count Liuthar of the Northern March. As we have seen, the 
collapse of the betrothal between their children and the subsequent abduction attempt in 999 
had led to a rupture in Liuthar and Ekkehard’s relationship. It was also Liuthar who had taken 
a leading role in preventing Ekkehard from gaining the full support of the Saxon magnates 
gathered at an earlier assembly at Frohse, and it was Liuthar who played a key part in 
arranging the Werla meeting.57 In fact, Thietmar explicitly mentioned that it was on his 
uncle’s advice that Henry sent a delegate to Werla to convice those assembled – including 
Adelheid and Sophia – to support him.58 Liuthar had realized the value of gaining Saxon 
support, including the approval of the two sisters of the previous emperor, and he also 
benefited from Ekkehard’s downfall and murder. Once Henry became king, Liuthar’s son 
Werner was finally able to marry Ekkehard’s daughter Liudgard, who at that point was still 
residing at Quedlinburg under Adelheid’s rule. After Liudgard had married his cousin, 
Thietmar formed a very close bond with her, mentioning in the Chronicon that she was 
particularly dear to him not just due to their family ties, but also through personal affection.59 
 
Yet Thietmar was also connected to Adelheid herself and to her convent. Thietmar’s father 
was Count Siegfried of Walbeck, and Mathilda of Quedlinburg had established a daughter 
convent at Walbeck in 992. In fact, Thietmar himself had been raised under Mathilda’s 
supervision, being put into the tutelage of his maternal aunt Emnilde, a canoness at 
Quedlinburg, until the age of 12.60 He must have maintained this connection to Quedlinburg 
under Adelheid’s rule, as his Chronicon drew on a copy of the Quedlinburg Annals that he 
acquired around 1013.61 It seems that Thietmar’s links to Quedlinburg and to Abbess 
Adelheid remained positive at the time that he was composing his text. 
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Consequently, Thietmar had a delicate task in explaining what had happened at Werla. This 
was compounded by the murder of Ekkehard after the feast, an event which directly benefited 
both Thietmar’s close relatives and the current king, Henry II, to whom Thietmar was 
particularly positively disposed due to his restoration of Thietmar’s diocese of Merseburg.62 
If Thietmar overtly outlined the links between Adelheid and Ekkehard’s party, or mentioned 
that Ekkehard could have expected her support, he would have placed Adelheid in a difficult 
position, as well as reminding his audience that the current king’s position as Otto’s 
successor in 1002 was not ironclad. On the other hand, if Thietmar did not use the events of 
the dinner to provide an explanation for the later murder, or at least to signal what might have 
caused it, then a shadow would remain over his relatives’ involvement.  
 
The ideal way out of this problem was to raise the idea that Ekkehard’s presence at the feast 
was an insult to the sisters, with frequent allusions to Ekkehard’s public display of arrogance, 
lack of humility and threatening behaviour at Werla. Thietmar could condemn Ekkehard’s 
murder for the unlawful act that it was, while still pinning the ultimate blame for the situation 
on Ekkehard himself. The problematic positions of Adelheid and the surviving powerful 
Saxon politicians who had supported Ekkehard in 1002 were skimmed over, and Adelheid 
was instead presented as a supporter of Henry, along with Sophia and the rest of the Saxon 
elite. Thietmar thus converted this politically volatile episode into an cautionary moral tale of 
the rewards of arrogance and pride, signalled by his quotation from Proverbs immediately 
after Ekkehard’s arrival at the feast in the text: ‘Before a downfall the heart is haughty, but 
humility comes before honour.’63 In doing so, Thietmar was able to neutralize the feast’s 
dangerous implications and mould it to fit his broader vision of Ottonian history.64 
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The Werla feast and its fallout reveal the issues that could arise when sudden political 
ruptures, like the unexpected death of an emperor, forced the ruling elite to separate into 
different factions. The Saxon nobility split into groups that were roughly based on their pre-
existing relationships, but as they were so closely connected in so many different ways, those 
decisions were not always straightforward. Openly supporting one candidate could lead to 
conflict with friends or relatives who chose to support a rival.These were not automatic 
divisions, but rather individual decisions made by people who needed to secure their own 
political futures. The sons of Siegfried of Northeim, for example, could have turned to 
support Ekkehard, as their fathers were both members of the 984 coniuratio, but they instead 
took part in Ekkehard’s murder, with Thietmar reporting that this may have been because 
they had served the sisters.65 The struggle to determine the next king left a number of 
individuals with difficult positions to reconcile in the wake of Henry’s coronation. Thietmar’s 
decision to shape the memory of the Werla assembly this way was perhaps also an attempt to 
smooth out the unresolved problems created by the succession crisis, at a time when we can 
see other reconciliations being made in the disputes caused by these events.66 
 
It is also worth noting that Thietmar left a number of questions open in his presentation of 
what happened at Werla. Duke Hermann is notable for his absence in this episode; directly 
before he recounted the Werla assembly, Thietmar made a brief comment that Hermann 
‘armed himself against Henry, as he had been seduced by many who were pleased by his 
gentleness’.67 Yet, other than Thietmar mentioning that Ekkehard headed west to meet 
Hermann after the feast, the duke only reappears in June 1002, when he tried to prevent 
Henry from crossing the Rhine to travel to Mainz for his consecration.68 Earlier, however, 
Thietmar had mentioned that Hermann had received the acclaim and support of the nobles 
who attended Otto III’s funeral at Aachen in April.69 The consequences of the events at 
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Werla directly affected Hermann, yet we hear nothing about his involvement or response.70 
Was this another attempt to clear the narrative path to Henry’s coronation? Thietmar is also 
silent about exactly what the ‘many good things’ were that Henry promised to the Saxons. It 
is likely that the consecration of Sophia as abbess by Willigis of Mainz was included in these 
promises. Sophia was consecrated in the same ceremony where Cunigund was crowned 
queen, making this event a powerful signal of Sophia’s royal favour, a reassertion of Henry’s 
familial links to Gandersheim, and perhaps an indication of the personal friendship between 
Sophia and Henry. But beyond that, we can only speculate. It may well be that Thietmar 
chose not to record what Henry had offered to the Saxons as rewards to support his 
candidacy, as little good could come from openly reminding his audience of this difficult – 
and potentially humiliating – episode in Ottonian politics. 
 
The situation faced by the elite of the Ottonian empire in 1002 was unusual to them; Ottonian 
sons had succeeded their fathers since 936, and they had been crowned as kings with their 
fathers’ approval since 961. In living memory, no ruler had died before he had nominated his 
successor, even if that successor’s claim to his father’s legacy had to be fiercely defended. 
Confronted with this political crisis, noble and ecclesiastical magnates responded by 
discussing and debating the matter, with candidates trying to accrue support from key 
political figures.71 In this environment, it mattered whom Adelheid and Sophia chose. Their 
approval was not simply given to whoever already had victory within their reach, nor was it 
automatically given to the candidate who was their closest relative. Both women were keenly 
interested in safeguarding their own futures as well as those of their institutions and they 
made their decisions accordingly. That they both backed Henry of Bavaria, however, should 
not lead us to assume that they were naturally inclined to support the same candidate, or even 
to belong to the same friendship groups. Because they each had a different set of needs and 
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different constellations of relationships, Adelheid and Sophia in the end both supported the 
same candidate for very different reasons. 
 
Ekkehard was an unexpected and unwanted guest at the sisters’ dinner. His appearance 
forced the sisters to deal with his claim to Adelheid’s support. Ekkehard was driven to this 
action in part because of his desperation at Henry’s ability to secure the support of both the 
sisters and of the Saxon nobles assembled there. His arrival at the feast, while unwelcome, 
was not made with the intention of spoiling it, but rather in the hopes of sharing it, to allow 
him to remain in the succession race. By moving outside of the usual negotiation process, 
Ekkehard revealed the messy nature of these political discussions in a public forum. That, 
along with the ultimately negative response of Adelheid and Sophia to his request, left him 
open to Thietmar’s suggestion that he had insulted the sisters and thus caused his own 
downfall.  
 
We can only understand the events at Werla if we take into account the web of political 
relationships in which these demonstrative acts were set. Those who created the texts that 
recounted ritual actions or symbolic gestures could often be interested parties themselves, and 
each had their own reasons for presenting these actions in the way that they did. In the case of 
the succession contest in 1002, the ruling elite of Germany were not simply debating the 
criteria by which a king should be chosen: each of them was also trying to make the best 
decision to secure their own future in this uncertain new political context. We must pay close 
attention to the connections between the individuals taking part in order to understand these 
moments of crisis and how they were represented textually. A complex framework of 
political relationships lay behind these public demonstrative acts; by tracing the shape of that 
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framework around these explosive moments, we can better appreciate the motivations of both 
the political actors involved and those who documented them. 
 





Ekkehard of Meißen’s appropriation of the feast prepared for the sisters of the late emperor 
Otto III was a turning point in the succession contest to determine the next ruler of Germany 
in 1002. Ekkehard’s arrival at the feast has been construed as an insult to the Ottonian sisters, 
marking the point at which he lost the succession race and paved the way for his own murder. 
However, there is no convincing explanation in current scholarship for why Ekkehard 
thought publicly insulting the family of the former emperor and breaking the regulated 
structure of Ottonian politics was a good move. This article sets Ekkehard’s actions at Werla 
into the broader context of Saxon politics by tracing the relationships between those present 
at the feast and the author of our account, Thietmar of Merseburg. In doing so, we can see 
that Ekkehard was not trying to offer an insult, but rather aggressively claim the support of 
one of the sisters by emphasizing their connections and mutual friends. By reassessing the 
disastrous feast at Werla, this article stresses the importance of taking into account the 
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